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Abstract To effectively address the drivers and impacts of
land degradation requires polycentric governance systems
that facilitate international development projects (IDPs).
This paper analyses an IDP aiming to reduce land
degradation in Swaziland. A longitudinal-style qualitative
approach draws on repeat household surveys, semi-
structured interviews and focus groups. We aim to
identify the changes that have taken place since the
departure of the IDP funders, and the subsequent dynamics
between stakeholders. We: (1) chart the evolution of the
institutional structures and processes of the IDP; and (2)
assess community perceptions of IDP outcomes. Lack of
meaningful participation at various stages of the PMC
caused the project to lose momentum following the
departure of the funders. We discuss these findings in
relation to a polycentric approach, and identify how multi-
stakeholder IDP can be facilitated as part of wider
polycentric governance approaches to inform policies to
combat land degradation within Swaziland and more
widely.
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INTRODUCTION
Land degradation is a global problem (UNCCD 1994). The
UNEP (2011) defines land degradation as ‘‘…reduction in
the capacity of the land to provide ecosystem goods and
services and assure its functions over a period of time for
its beneficiaries’’ UNEP (2011, p. 1). Estimates of total
degraded area vary from just less than 10 % to approxi-
mately 40 % of the Earth’s 148 300 000 km2 land surface
(Gibbs and Salmon 2015). Efforts to prevent, reduce and
rehabilitate degraded areas are enshrined in international
policies and development frameworks, including the sus-
tainable development goals (SDGs). Major causes of land
degradation include: (1) human activities resulting in
unsustainable land use and management, such as defor-
estation, overexploitation of natural resources and over-
grazing; and (2) biophysical factors such as topography,
soil quality and climate change and variability (Kairis et al.
2014). Consequences include: reduced productivity, food
insecurity, biodiversity loss and loss of ecosystem goods
and services (UNEP 2011), as well as knock on impacts for
human health, livelihoods and wellbeing. These causes and
consequences occur over multiple interacting temporal and
spatial scales (see Reynolds et al. 2007). Land degradation
is therefore a complex, uncertain and multi-scale phe-
nomenon, affecting multiple actors and agencies, and
requiring transparent decision making that is responsive to
changing circumstances (Stringer et al. 2009). There is
growing acknowledgement that centralised, top-down
mechanisms are inadequate for tackling land degradation
as well as ensuring the sustainable use of natural resources
more widely (Nagendra and Ostrom 2012). This has led to
a shift in design and implementation of international
development projects (IDPs) towards decentralisation and
community participation (Stringer et al. 2014).
Central concepts
Participation often takes place in IDP that form part of a
broader programme approach. IDP adopts participatory
approaches in an attempt to foster institutional mechanisms
through which local stakeholders’ needs and interests can
theoretically be included in the design and implementation
of natural resource management (Akbulut and Soylu 2012).
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Indeed, international agencies such as the United Nations
(UN) and World Bank (WB) advocate community partic-
ipation within their IDP for building effective, efficient and
equitable natural resource governance. However, IDP
typically faces time, cost and quality constraints, making
them largely social and political undertakings (Bixler
2014): social in that they aim to improve the wellbeing of
target populations; political in that the choice of issue,
location and target group are decisions made by IDP
donors, agencies, political leaders and policy makers
(Diallo and Thuillier 2004). IDP implementation also
typically occurs at the local level, in specific locations and
by particular groups of people (Nagendra and Ostrom
2012). Whilst IDP can facilitate sustainable development if
designed, implemented and managed appropriately (Ika
2012), they can exacerbate land degradation challenges if
not (MEA 2005). Ensuring the wellbeing of populations
faced with the challenge of land degradation requires
multi-tier governance solutions that facilitate IDP to
address both the drivers and impacts of the problem (Na-
gendra and Ostrom 2012).
Polycentric governance enhances participation by fos-
tering inclusive decision making from divergent groups,
between and among multiple centres of authority and
scales of governance (Andersson and Ostrom 2008). The
types of ecosystem service that natural resources provide,
change as the physical scale of the resource changes (Na-
gendra and Ostrom 2012). For example, soils support the
provision of food at the local level, and carbon to regulate
the climate at the global level. No single level of gover-
nance can provide incentives for users to safeguard the
long-term delivery of such a variety of services, while
bestowing management of natural resources to external
experts is unlikely to be sustainable. The complexity of
natural resources at local, regional, national and global
levels requires complex governance systems involving
input from local resource users in diverse fashions. Poly-
centric governance can foster the necessary relationships
between and among actors who have a stake in the resource
at multiple scales. Hence, it is a useful approach for
encouraging flexibility, interlinkages, adaptation and resi-
lience into the system through developing structures and
processes to match the multi-scale nature of such resources
(Ostrom 2005).
IDP progress in broadly similar ways regardless of the
issue being targeted (Crawford and Bryce 2003). Activities
typically follow a project management cycle (PMC) as a
rational way of conceptualising and managing such pro-
jects (Biggs and Smith 2003). Academic analyses focus
predominantly on evaluating the success of either project
implementation or project outcomes, overlooking aspects
pertinent to distinctive phases of the PMC where changes
to governance, and therefore opportunities for stakeholder
participation, can occur (Khang and Moe 2008). Biggs and
Smith (2003) present a framework (Fig. 1) that identifies
phases present in almost all project cycles: programming,
identification, design, support, implementation and evalu-
ation (Table 1). Learning is integral: i.e. ‘‘…making
adjustments during the project cycle in response to ongoing
events and taking account of past experience in future
planning’’ (Biggs and Smith 2003, p. 1743). Furthermore,
the framework considers processes of participation at every
stage, and can incorporate a range of assessment criteria at
various points in the cycle, e.g. environment, gender,
empowerment, capacity building, institutional develop-
ment and sustainability. Recognising the intangible nature
of many IDP results, the framework can be used to assess
and forecast project success by analysing the complex
relationships between stakeholders, progressively assessing
performance at each stage of the PMC to provide insights
into the problems and challenges of governance. Hence, a
dynamic framework is developed that identifies various
success criteria and institutional aspects at different phases
that shape IDP success or failure.
IDP is understudied in the PMC literature (Ika et al.
2010), and little is understood about the factors at various
stages of the PMC that shape variation of outcomes within
decentralised IDP (Khang and Moe 2008), i.e. : the inter-
action between and among multiple actors, authorities,
organisations and sectors at multiple scales of governance
that shape IDP success or failure. Furthermore, IDP eval-
uations often take place immediately after a project without
sufficiently considering the longer-term impacts or suc-
cesses (Ika 2012; Bixler 2014). To address this gap, this
paper links the polycentric governance and IDP manage-
ment literatures, and applies the PMC framework to an IDP
aiming to reduce land degradation in Swaziland.
This paper explores an IDP commencing in December
2000 aiming to rehabilitate degraded land. We analyse the
situation after the departure of funders in January 2004
building on studies by Stringer (2004) and Stringer et al.
Fig. 1 Project management cycle, adapted from Biggs and Smith
(2003)
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(2007). The IDP involved a range of stakeholders from
multiple levels, including the Government of Swaziland’s
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, the Japanese
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), a Swazi NGO,
as well as local people. This paper aims to identify the
changes that have taken place since the departure of the
IDP funders, and the subsequent dynamics between
stakeholders. We: (1) chart the evolution of the institu-
tional structures and processes of the IDP; and (2) assess
community perceptions of IDP outcomes. Lack of mean-
ingful participation at various stages of the PMC caused the
project to lose momentum following the departure of the
funders. We discuss these findings in relation to a poly-
centric approach, and identify how multi-stakeholder IDP
can be facilitated as a part of wider polycentric governance
approaches to inform policies to combat land degradation
within Swaziland and more widely.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study country: Swaziland
Three quarters of Swaziland’s 1419 623 inhabitants live in
rural areas and typically engage in subsistence agriculture
(World Bank 2015). Just over two-thirds of Swaziland’s
17, 364 km2 area is under agricultural use for arable crop
farming and livestock production (World Bank 2015).
Land degradation is a major environmental problem
(Tfwala et al. 2012), with just over half the country’s area
suffering from some form of land degradation (World Bank
2015). Mismanagement of rangelands through overgrazing,
uncontrolled burning and vegetation depletion cause soil
erosion and gullying, whilst degradation of cultivated land
results from inadequate nutrient replenishment causing a
depletion of soil fertility and weed infestations (Stringer
et al. 2007; Manyatsi and Maseko 2010).
Swaziland has an unusual land tenure system, with 56 %
designated as SwaziNational Land (SNL) held in trust for the
nation by the King (Mavimbela et al. 2010). Plots for small-
scale agriculture are allocated by chiefs to married males
(Funnell 1991). Approximately three quarters of the popu-
lation live on SNL (Xaba and Masuku 2013), where the
principal crop is maize, though groundnuts, dry beans, sor-
ghum, pumpkins, jugo beans, soya beans and sweet potatoes
are also often grown (Mavimbela et al. 2010). 44 % of land is
title deed land (TDL), where exclusive access rights are
defined and typically allocated to corporate actors (Mushala
et al. 1998). TDL is typically used for commercial purposes
and characterised by high levels of investment to grow high
values crops (e.g. sugar cane, citrus fruits and trees for tim-
ber). This paper focuses on an IDP on SNL.
The monarchy and chiefs dominate the country’s polit-
ical structure, with their authority legitimised by means of
a patriarchal society and control over land, access to cattle
and wives. Multiparty politics has been illegal since sus-
pension of the constitution in 1973, with all powers vested
in the King since 1979. The current King, Mswati III,
ascended to the throne in 1986. Parliament is based on the
traditional Tinkhundla system, whereby the public vote for
candidates from an approved list. This provides the
opportunity for the King to distribute royal power
throughout the country whilst maintaining central control
and averting much of society from participating in political
processes. Little real progress has been made towards
democratisation, and the alienation of citizens from formal
political processes provides an interesting background
context against which participatory IDP are superimposed.
Table 1 Description of project management cycle phases
Phase Description
Programming A broad plan is developed considering the local, national and international context. An overall framework
of objectives for a specific country, issue or sector within which single projects can be identified and
conducted is agreed upon
Identification The issues and needs of a particular group are assessed, influenced by pressure from political, social,
cultural, ethnic or other groups. Ideas to address these needs are produced and analysed. This may
involve consultation with potential beneficiaries through participatory rural appraisal (PRA) techniques
Design Ideas are worked into tangible operational strategies to be measured against various criteria (e.g. gender,
environment, livelihoods, sustainability, etc.) which are contingent on the source and type of support
necessary
Support Numerous types of assistance are sought, e.g. financial, political, institutional, etc. Obtaining the required
support involves considerable negotiation and can lead to alterations in the project design
Implementation Operational strategies are conducted while continuously monitoring progress towards projected
objectives. Alterations are frequently made to the original plans in light of unanticipated circumstances
and events
Evaluation Success or failure is evaluated in terms of its impact on stakeholders, achievement of objectives and the
lessons learned. Lessons are fed back into the ‘Programming’ phase to inform future planning
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Research design and methodology
Data were collected during May–October 2002 and
September–October 2014 (see Stringer (2004) for more
details and Table 2 for a summary).
All households in the study chiefdom were surveyed
during both 2002 (n = 74) and 2014 (n = 84). Question-
naires sought information on local livelihoods, land use
practices and environmental priorities, including the types
of environmental changes that have occurred in the com-
munity over the last (up to) 50 years and how they affected
livelihood strategies and household wellbeing. Case study
households were selected for transect walks and semi-
structured interviews based on survey responses, using
purposive sampling (see Stringer 2004). The same case
study households participated in 2014 as in 2002, at which
time, their involvement in the research was based on them:
having access to up to 4 ha of land; having been established
in the area over 20 years. Each household represented a
different level of wealth and income relative to other
households in the chiefdom (see Stringer 2004). Transect
walks through arable plots aided familiarisation with local
context, history and issues relating to the community, while
also enabling more targeted questioning for the subsequent
semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews
with the same households provided in-depth past and pre-
sent perspectives on degradation and the project’s struc-
tures, processes and impact during the two periods covered
by the data collection. They elucidated the involvement of
community members at each phase of the PMC, particu-
larly: (a) the design of the project (2002), (b) the imple-
mentation of the project (2002 and 2014), (c) the
monitoring and evaluation of the project (2014).
Semi-structured interviews with people working on the
IDP in 2002 focused on how participatory it was, what it
would achieve in terms of social and environmental ben-
efits, and how they (and their household) would gain from
involvement. Focus groups with six members of the vil-
lage-level project committee were conducted towards the
end of data collection in both 2002, and four members in
2014, to: (1) explore the degree of consensus between
committee members after completion of the implementa-
tion phase (2002), and (2) subsequent handing over of the
project to the community (2014). Care was taken to ensure
effective facilitation throughout the focus groups, with all
participants given the opportunity to contribute. No indi-
vidual was allowed to dominate discussions. Iterative
reflections were carried out jointly with participants during
both focus groups to determine how and why any conflicts
in information may have occurred, and also served to
validate the findings from semi-structured interviews with
key households. Data were supplemented with a series of
short semi-structured interviews in 2014 with the chairman
of the original project committee. Consultants working for
the project’s international donor, JICA, were interviewed
in 2002. However, we were unable to track them down for
repeat interviews in 2014. Application of all methods (i.e.
transect walks, questionnaires, semi-structured interviews
and focus groups) lasted no longer than one and a half
hours each, were undertaken in the local language with a
translator. Detailed notes were made including translated
direct quotations, which were then transferred to electronic
copies.
Data analysis was iterative, with qualitative data initially
coded under themes relating to different stages of the PMC,
then subcategorised according to group/stakeholder. Pat-
terns within codes and subcategories were then identified
and grouped to facilitate identification of the structures,
processes and impacts that shaped governance of the pro-
ject. This is consistent with the Grounded Theory approach
(Corbin and Strauss 1990), as categories emerged through
iterative data analysis, refining the codes as new data were
evaluated. This resulted in a cyclical process culminating
in inductive interpretation and explanation of results.
RESULTS
This section sets out the results, drawing on data from both
2002 and 2014.
Background to the IDP and the situation as of 2002
Programming
In 1996, Swaziland’s government requested the govern-
ment of Japan to investigate the improvement of degraded
land in Swaziland’s middleveld region. Consultants con-
ducted literature and policy reviews and highlighted gul-
lying and erosion on communal rangeland as the most
Table 2 Data collected during 2002 and 2014
Data collection method 2002 2014
Household questionnaires 74 84
Transect walks with key households 3 3
Semi-structured interviews with key
households
3 3
Focus group with original project
committee members
1 1
Semi-structured interviews with
project workers
46 0
Focus group with JICA consultants 1 0
Series of interviews with original
project committee chair
0 1
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pressing form of land degradation. JICA, working with
Swaziland’s Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
(MOAC), deemed that addressing degradation on com-
munal land would allow decentralised and participatory
approaches to be enacted, in line with the dominant inter-
national development practice of the time. Such an
approach also supported the consultative, participatory
approach outlined in the UN Convention to Combat
Desertification, the main international treaty for dealing
with land degradation, to which Swaziland is a signatory.
Identification
Following regional workshops and meetings, the chiefdom
of Engcayini (Table 3) was selected to host a pilot IDP due
to the prevalence of extensive gullying, some of the worst
in the country, as visible from aerial photos used by the
JICA consultants. Local residents were invited to attend
workshops at the planning stages of the project, convened
by JICA and MOAC, where livestock were identified as the
main cause of erosion on communal land due to over-
grazing and the creation of cattle tracks (in combination
with seasonal rains). Whilst better-off households in the
chiefdom (i.e. those with cattle concerned about erosion on
communal rangeland) were able to voice their concerns and
preferences, the concerns of more marginalised households
(i.e. households lacking cattle who were more concerned
with soil fertility on arable land) were overlooked. As an
outcome from the workshops, JICA and MOAC proposed
some broad approaches for tackling rangeland erosion,
from which the community selected what they considered
to be the most appropriate intervention. However, arable
farming was the main source of income for 18 % of
households (2002 data), and provides subsistence for the
majority of others. The desirability of a project aimed at
grazing on communal rangelands as opposed to arable land
thus may have been overestimated. This indicates that the
framing of the project and subsequent decisions were taken
without full and meaningful participation of the
community.
Design
A number of schemes were designed within the project in
order to tackle land degradation, including: (1) a fenced
grazing scheme which subdivided the selected target
communal rangeland area in order to rotate and control
grazing; (2) a beef fattening feedlot scheme, which built
structures with a 140 m2 area of concrete slabs, a water
trough and a feed trough providing fodder grown in a field
situated next to the feedlot; (3) a tree nursery scheme with
a capacity of 160 000 seedlings was developed for agro-
forestry and woodlot use; (4) an afforestation
scheme planted 6000 trees around a severe gully to prevent
Table 3 Characteristics of the study chiefdom, Engcayini
Characteristic Detailed information
Location Upper middleveld, approximately 30 min by car along gravel roads from Manzini, Swaziland’s largest urban
settlement. Irregular and expensive transport means that access to services, markets and information are limited
Environmental
characteristics
Rolling to hilly topography; slopes ranging from 15 to 30 (Jansen et al. 1994). Land is classed as good to fair in terms
of production potential, with soils comprising sandy loams with patches of acid clay
Population 84 homesteads. Most households are headed by males with an average household size of 4–8 people
Power structure Former chief has not yet been replaced, so authority lies with an acting chief who lives outside of the community. The
Indvunaa of Engcayini lives within the chiefdom, and the village elders exert considerable authority
Livelihood activities Waged employment, sale of arable crops, sale of natural resources, handicrafts
Arable production All households grow maize, often in conjunction with groundnuts, sweet potatoes and beans. Drought, poor soils and
parasitic weed infestations (e.g. Striga asiatica) are considered the main constraints to arable production
Livestock ownership The number of households with cattle dropped from 68 % in 2002 to 55 % in 2014. Cattle are kept for food, draught
power and manure, and are also viewed as an indicator of social status. Cattle herds have reportedly decreased in
size over the last 10 years, primarily as a result of drought and disease. Goats are also kept by a number of
households
Degradation problems The topography combined with seasonal rains and thin soils in places predispose the land to erosion. Communal land is
severely gullied in parts due to concentration of runoff along cattle tracks, particularly on the slopes close to the dip
tank. Gullies reportedly worsened in ‘Cyclone Domonia’, which swept through the area in 1984. Soils have medium
to low levels of N, P and K and widespread parasitic weed infestations indicate degraded soils in arable areas.
Woodland areas supporting species used as fuel wood have decreased significantly in recent decades, but overall
woodland areas have increased due to the increase of invasive species
a The Indvuna is the chairman of the local council (Inkhundla) and is selected by the chief, who may appoint any person as an Indvuna in respect
of his chiefdom, and similarly, the chief may terminate the appointment. Should a chief be absent or a chiefdom be awaiting a new chief, the
Indvuna may assume the role of chief, although he remains subordinate to an acting chief (Stringer et al. 2007)
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further erosion. Eucalyptus and wattle trees were mainly
selected as initial tree species for the sake of soil conser-
vation, as well as use for poles and fuel wood in future. The
choice of species was JICA’s, informed by observations of
successful growing and community utilisation of previous
planting projects that used government resources and
community labour.
Support
A Swazi NGO with agricultural development expertise
coordinated the local activities. The NGO was expected to
report on the progress of the project and to provide any
necessary materials and training. It was agreed at one of the
initial workshops that to ensure that the project was man-
aged and owned as much as possible by the community, a
project committee made up of representatives from the
village should be democratically elected. The committee
was intended to bridge the gaps between JICA, MOAC, the
NGO and the community, and mobilise the community to
join in with the implementation of the project. Committee
members included five men and four women.
Implementation
Four main issues occurred during implementation. First,
issues of fairness arose as the committee decided everyone
should pay the same membership fee to join the
scheme regardless of cattle ownership, with an additional
levy on each animal that used the feedlot. Furthermore, to
ensure commitment to the project, fines were imposed upon
households failing to send individuals to work on the
project twice a week. However, for poorer households with
little or no cattle, household tasks on arable land were
given priority over the rehabilitation of the rangeland,
leaving them susceptible to fines. Whilst many households
do not own cattle, by subscribing to the scheme they were
maintaining their access rights to utilise it should they one
day obtain cattle. Therefore, although seemingly unfair in
the short term for those without cattle, the scheme did
display elements of fairness regarding access rights in the
longer term. Second, issues of capacity arose relating to the
lack of awareness and capacity for participatory gover-
nance among traditional authorities, the elected project
implementation committee and local residents. The com-
munity was also unaware of the full functions of the
committee, and as the committee was accountable to JICA
and the Swazi NGO, there was a lack of downward
accountability. Third, the location and boundaries for the
grazing, feedlot and nursery were situated in areas that
local residents used for other purposes, such as bridleways
to church, community centres, rivers, springs, forests or
neighbouring households. Finally, conflicts emerged
between the elected committee and traditional institutions,
as the project committee began making decisions regarding
the project without consulting the traditional authorities.
Inadequate communication between the project committee,
the elders and the acting chief were stated as the root of the
problem.
Evaluation
Quantitative data from 2002 (Stringer et al. 2007) revealed
that whilst most people were happy to work on the project
(89 %): 70 % felt excluded from the project design; 57 %
stated that they would have liked to be more involved in
the design; and 20 % were only involved because they felt
they ‘had to be’. The majority of people that felt that they
gained little from the project were female, young and had
no cattle. Marginalised households (i.e. poor households
with little or no cattle) that could pay the standard joining
fee sacrificed more in time and labour, through the
opportunity cost of working on arable land, while receiving
less as they had no cattle. Those with no cattle, or limited
ability to pay the access fee, had potentially accessibility of
land held in common reduced by the scheme. The oppor-
tunity for those with cattle to increase their wealth, coupled
with the fees levied at marginalised households that lack
livestock, reinforced and exacerbated pre-existing
inequalities. Hence, the imposition of the project onto
existing socio-political and economic structures served to
consolidate the position and interests of powerful actors.
Qualitative data showed that the lack of accountability
resulted in many of the communities feeling that the pro-
ject was owned by the committee, not the community,
which generated resentment towards the committee. The
legacy of exclusion, lack of awareness and capacity among
authorities, and scant engagement of citizens in political
processes meant that marginalised households are likely to
expect those in authority to control and direct the project.
This created the opportunity for elites to capture the ben-
efits by steering the project towards more effective cattle
management, while those who used the rangeland in other
ways lost out and therefore placed additional pressure on
the remaining communal land. Consequently, the project
failed to foster meaningful community participation.
Development of the project and the situation
as of 2014
Figure 2 summarises data from 2002 together with those
from 2014 within the PMC. The following sections unpack
these in relation to participation, institutions, resources and
outcomes.
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Project participation
Semi-structured interviews with key households in 2014
revealed that, subsequent to feelings of exclusion during the
identification and design stages of the project in 2002,
respondents’ concerns about the design of the project (which
they had little say in) had been vindicated as the project pro-
gressed. For example, in order to mitigate the impact of
rainfall on land degradation through erosion on communal
rangeland, JICA designed a system of water furrows to divert
water away from a major gully in the village. This was done
without community input.However,when becoming aware of
the designs for the system of furrows, the villagers noted
among themselves that this would not be sustainable, due to
the landscape’s physical attributes and water flows that cause
waterlogging in certain areas around the gully. For the vil-
lagers it was clear that the planned system of water furrows
and reservoirs would eventually overflow and cause further
erosion. Yet, they had no avenue to share this knowledge with
JICA, who had already decided on the design of the water
furrows and it was not open to debate. This demonstrates a
need for deeper meaningful community participation, partic-
ularly at the stages of problem definition and design. If the
community had been truly engaged in the project and been
allowed the space to identify environmental priorities, perhaps
some of the problems could have been avoided.
Project institutions
The initial project implementation committee was demo-
cratically elected to implement the project using commu-
nity labour. Household interviews in 2014 supported data
from 2002 that indicated friction between the committee
and the traditional authorities, as well as elite capture. The
Indvuna attempted to establish a foothold within the
committee in order to take the credit for the benefits
coming from the project. The chairman of the project
committee challenged the actions of the Indvuna, arguing
that they conflicted with the project objectives. However,
he noted, it was very difficult to oppose the traditional
authorities as they hold most power and can overrule
notions from any other group. Subsequently, when the
implementation phase was complete, with JICA with-
drawing their support and handing over the project to the
‘community’, a new committee was appointed by the
Indvuna. The new committee was entrusted with project
maintenance, and reported directly to the Indvuna. How-
ever, the community felt that the lack of democratic pro-
cess in the selection of the new maintenance committee
meant that the best people with the right skills and moti-
vation were not selected, rather individuals were nominated
who were preferred by the Indvuna. This resulted in elite
capture of the project.
Fig. 2 Project management cycle in relation to the JICA project
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Project resources
Focus groups with committee members in 2014 implied
that following the withdrawal of JICA, the maintenance
committee did not receive any training in project man-
agement. Furthermore, no money or other resources were
available to support the maintenance of the project, con-
tributing to the collapse of the feedlot and grazing schemes.
The feedlot scheme failed partly due to lack of money for
feed; the grazing scheme failed partly due to lack of funds
for fertiliser and fence maintenance/replacement. Further-
more, the lack of monitoring by JICA following their
withdrawal was also highlighted as a reason contributing to
the failure of project schemes. The afforestation
scheme was nevertheless sustained through the natural
growth from the seeds of planted trees, which residents had
to pay a fee to enter. Household interviews in 2014 indicate
that residents felt that the failure of the project, reflected in
the increasing severity of gullies, was due to poor main-
tenance. Residents were also dismayed at having to pay to
access benefits of a project that was intended for them and
implemented using their labour. Following withdrawal of
JICA and appointment of the maintenance committee, the
community had to pay to access any area under the project:
first a fee to the Indvuna in order to gain a permit; and then
to the committee in order to gain access to the permitted
area. Failure to pay for permits resulted in the issuance of a
fine. Whilst some community members were unsure where
the money made from this goes, others speculated that the
money is captured by the Indvuna and the maintenance
committee. This sets up a clear structure of ‘winners’ and
‘losers’ within the community.
Project outcomes
Key household interviews in 2014 indicate that the com-
munity was disappointed to see the project fail and began
to lose confidence in its processes. Interviewees believed
this was due to the lack of motivation and commitment of
the maintenance committee, noting a similar project in an
adjacent village that had been more successful due to
highly motivated and committed leaders. The disparity
between the intended objectives of JICA and the private
financial gain of local elites from the project led many
residents to become disillusioned and confused as to whom
the project belongs and who is responsible for it. Subse-
quently, whilst the community recognises the need for and
potential benefit of such projects, they feel reluctant to get
involved with future projects as experience shows that they
primarily benefit local elites, and can even cause more
problems within the community. The lack of community
input and ownership, and elite capture of project benefits,
resulted in loss of interest and respect for the project within
the community. Many residents felt inconvenienced by the
positioning of the grazing area, feedlot and nursery, and
continued to use project-designated areas as bridleways.
Theft and damage caused to the materials necessary for the
project to successfully function (such as wire fencing, posts
and gates to demarcate grazing, feedlot and woodlot areas)
went virtually unchallenged.
DISCUSSION
Participation
Challenges to polycentric governance, in which power is
more equally distributed across levels, result from the top-
down nature of IDP and lack of meaningful participation of
divergent groups at various stages of the PMC. Participa-
tion is particularly challenging in contexts with tradition-
ally top-down and highly hierarchical institutions, such as
Swaziland, where communities and other groups have not
traditionally had a substantial input in decision making
(Stringer et al. 2009). Subsequent top-down conception and
initiation of the IDP resulted in culturally inappropriate
processes of community engagement and failure to align
local priorities with project goals, which been shown to
undermine sustainable natural resource governance
(Mustalahti et al. 2012). In failing to devise adequate plans
for the encouragement and sustained participation of
divergent groups within the community from the outset,
this constrained the ability of all groups to contribute and
share their knowledge throughout its development (An-
dersson and Ostrom 2008). Furthermore, this resulted in
misunderstanding of the project aims and objectives by
local actors, and of external agents of the natural resource
system and contextual factors that shape local governance
(Armitage et al. 2009; Dyer et al. 2014).
Whilst local institutions strongly influence resource
management (Agrawal and Benson 2011), sustainable
resource management requires local participation within a
collaborative framework of ‘‘cross-scale’’ or ‘‘multilevel’’
polycentric networks that go beyond local arrangements
(Brondizio et al. 2009). Therefore, whilst maintaining a
focus on the environmental aspects of land degradation,
IDP should also provide local-level actors from diverse
groups the opportunity to access institutions at multiple
levels of governance. This is necessary to foster negotiation
between diverse actors and knowledge systems (Nagendra
and Ostrom 2012). The subsequent lack of integration of
local and external actor perceptions and knowledge (see
Raymond et al. 2010) failed to harness the potential of
polycentric governance, i.e. to respond to environmental
change by utilising the complementarities of different
stakeholders and overcome the limitations and weakness of
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each (Andersson and Ostrom 2008). Whilst the context of
Swaziland is unusual, remaining an absolute monarchy
whereas most countries have moved towards constitutional
monarchies, lessons here are applicable to other cases
where IDPs are conceived and initiated in a top-down
manner within areas where power is typically spread
throughout governance levels, from local to national. It is
crucial to understand such structures in order to understand
the challenges to polycentric governance and devise ways
to address them (Orchard et al. 2015).
Conflict and elite capture
IDP outcomes are shaped by the pre-existing institutional
structures and processes which challenge patterns of
polycentric governance through institutional conflict, elite
capture and ineffective, unrepresentative and opaque gov-
ernance structures and processes. Establishment of the
project implementation committee led to conflict between
new and traditional institutions. Whilst the democratically
elected committee was established to oversee implemen-
tation of the project, Tole (2010) argues that it is naı¨ve to
believe that such interventions by bureaucrats, NGOs or
local leaders will be adequate for project success in
heterogeneous, stratified and unequal societies. Further-
more, traditional authorities ultimately held the greatest
power at the local level. Whilst initial project engagement
should be conducted through traditional authorities in order
to obtain their permission and approval in southern Africa,
this can mean that participation at each stage of the PMC is
not representative of the community (Dyer et al. 2014).
Local power structures were reinforced as a result, with
elites capturing project benefits owing to greater access to
finance and decision-making authority, particularly as there
was no corresponding opportunities for participation for
checks and balances (see Mwangi and Wardell 2012).
Results indicate conflicts arising from lack of common
understanding, legitimacy, monitoring and enforcement of
project rules. Failure to recognise the multiscale aspects of
natural resource governance obstructed polycentric gover-
nance, which has been shown to resolve conflicts from
competing jurisdictions and opportunistic behaviour by
elites by embracing institutional diversity and distributing
power evenly between centres of power and authority
(Pahl-Wostl 2009). By embracing polycentric governance,
IDP can provide support for local resource users affected
by land degradation to create small-scale provision net-
works and encourage face-to-face discussion (Biggs et al.
2012). This can foster stronger institutions that build trust
and cooperation to enable local actors to devise rules for
access, use, monitoring, sanctioning and resolving conflict
(Mokhahlane and Obi 2011). By nesting small-scale pro-
vision networks within larger-scale networks, divergent
groups could be integrated into processes susceptible to
elite capture and create more responsive, transparent and
accountable governance (Andersson and Ostrom 2008).
This will still require a supportive central government,
rather than absent or controlling, to ensure decentralisation
is not appropriated by local elites (Lockwood et al. 2009).
Outcomes
Challenges to polycentric governance throughout the PMC
resulted in negative IDP outcomes of inequitable resource
access, confusion and reduced trust in local institutions,
and a loss of motivation to participate within future IDP in
the community. In the absence of tangible benefits for
marginalised households with little or no cattle, the project
failed to respond to unequal benefit distribution (see Suich
2013). Johnson (2004) highlights the dangers of internal
divisions that can emanate from such situations, observed
when the community felt that the project was not theirs as
initially intended, but instead ended up being appropriated
by local elites for their own benefit. Subsequent disillu-
sionment within the community regarding responsibilities,
management procedures and enforcement mechanisms of
the project resulted in the loss of legitimacy and trust in
project structures and processes (see Measham and Lum-
basi 2013). This supports suggestions that the political
dimensions of IDP can make them vulnerable to manipu-
lation through the marginalisation of certain stakeholder
views (Khang and Moe 2008), and that the motivations and
incentives of local actors, particularly elites, can shape the
trajectory and outcomes of projects on the ground (see
Clark et al. 2011). Therefore, caution is required as local
struggles for power in the spaces of opportunity opened up
by projects can be inherently destabilising and disruptive
(Saunders et al. 2010).
Failure to acknowledge divergent perspectives within
the community caused frustration as this leads expectations
to be unfulfilled (Hogl et al. 2012). Matta and Alavalapati
(2006) state that governance processes must be responsive
to such negative project impacts as this shapes motivation
to participate in future projects. In line with Matta and
Alavalapati (2006), a lack of understanding of the diver-
gent priorities and perspectives within the community, and
lack of will or capacity for participation among those in
authority, meant that governance processes were limited in
their potential to respond. IDP can foster polycentric
governance by creating and enabling small-scale local user
networks to embed themselves within larger-scale net-
works of NGOs and governmental actors at multiple levels.
This will facilitate effective feedback, learning and crafting
of new and better solutions that can sustain community
motivation to participate in natural resource management
(Ostrom and Ahn 2009). By embedding such networks
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within polycentric governance arrangements, the locally
developed but externally supported institutional arrange-
ments are more likely to be sustained after the departure of
project funders (see Garcı´a-Lo´pez 2013).
CONCLUSION
Studying the challenges facing polycentric governance,
where diversity, complexity and scale are considered to be
integral components, is crucial for sustainable natural
resource management (Reed and Bruyneel 2010). This
paper has analysed case study data from an externally
initiated IDP aiming to improve the rural environment in
degraded areas of Swaziland, using a PMC framework to
understand challenges to polycentric governance using
empirical case study data. Using a longitudinal approach
provided a useful and novel temporal dimension to
improve understanding of the critical aspects of gover-
nance structures and processes that shape land use over
time, and which are crucial to the study of sustainable
development. This provided the opportunity to identify
additional aspects that shape project success or failure that
are often missed in project evaluations that take place
shortly after the donor withdraws. We find a number of
challenges to polycentric governance resulting from lack of
participation at various stages of the PMC, namely: inap-
propriately defined communities and the priorities of
divergent groups overlooked; conflict between centres of
authority causing confusion over the aims and responsi-
bilities of the project; pre-existing institutional structures
and processes at the local level shaping inequitable benefit
distributions; governance that is unresponsive to emerging
challenges causing loss of community motivation for cur-
rent and future IDP.
By studying the challenges to polycentric governance,
through the interaction of actors between and among dif-
ferent levels of governance, it is possible to contribute to a
more nuanced understanding of the variation in diverse
governance outcomes. In order to harness the potential of
polycentric governance, we recommend IDP: support
communities to develop small-scale provision networks,
nested within larger-scale networks of external experts,
rather than the creation of committees with the sole aim of
implementing externally designed plans; enable provision
networks to participate in each stage of the PMC and
access institutions at multiple levels of governance; facil-
itate collaborative institutions that embrace institutional
diversity and encourage even distribution of power; sustain
support of institutional linkages that build trust and coop-
eration for continued participation of local actors after the
departure of IDP funders. Whilst the participation of local
resource users at every stage of the PMC is crucial to
ensure IDP are locally appropriate with community buy-in,
collaboration with diverse institutions is necessary in order
to harness the knowledge of various stakeholders whilst not
alienating or threatening the position of traditional leaders.
Whilst a certain level of context specificity is to be
expected, numerous lessons are generalizable to natural
resource projects in other regions and in encouraging novel
kinds of environmental management. The analysis of
multi-stakeholder approaches in this context provides
useful new insights to help IDP adapt participatory and
collaborative models to a broader range of governance
contexts, particularly where IDP are faced with powerful
local actors and institutions. Future research would benefit
from continued longitudinal studies to understand the
dynamics of institutional arrangements for natural resource
management more broadly. This would help address one of
the most pivotal challenges of understanding how broader
institutional contexts shape local responses and solutions to
land degradation.
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